comments to Chp. 1 Second Draft UPDATE: finished oct. 26

Submitted by Tom Last on Sat, 10/24/2009 - 3:38pm.


Commented in red -Tom

Chapter 1: Conscious Human Action
1.0 The Question of Freedom
[1] Is the human being free in thought and action, or inescapably controlled by natural laws?
Seems that freedom here would refer to being free "in" something such as "thoughts" and "actions". In chapter 3-0 Whether this activity of mine is really an expression of my own independent being, or whether modern physiologists are right in saying that we cannot think as we will, but rather have to think exactly as determined by the thoughts and thought-connections that happen to be present in our minds at any given moment, is a question that will be the subject of a later discussion. (deleted entirely natural laws as a distracting extra word not needed)

Is the human being free in thinking and action, or irresistibly compelled by purely natural laws?
[Is the human being[a free thinker and doer / free to think and act/ a free spirit/agent in thought and actio], or entirely controlled/constrained by inescapable laws of nature/natural laws?] [Are human beings free in their thinking and action, or inescapably controlled by entirely natural laws?] Few questions have been the focus of so much ingenuity. The idea of free will has found as many enthusiastic supporters as stubborn opponents.  change of meaning: it is not that an equal number of both sides exists but that there are
--plenty/many/great number-- of both. The idea of free will has found a great number of both enthusiastic supporters and stubborn opponents.

There are those who, with a high moral tone, label as narrow-minded anyone who denies the obvious fact of freedom. Opposed to them are others who consider it the peak of unscientific thinking for anyone to believe that the uniformity of natural law [is broken/breaks down] in the field of human action and thought.
Opposed to them are others who consider it the peak of unscientific thinking for anyone to believe that the uniformity of natural law is broken in the field of human action and thought.
uniformity of natural law refers to the unbroken chain of cause and effect.The universality and uniformity of Natural Law--that continuity of cause and effect which runs unbroken through the warp and woof of the very universe.

One and the same thing is just as often proclaimed to be humanity's most precious possession as it is to be its worst illusion. Endless subtle distinctions have been used to explain how human freedom can be compatible with determinism in nature, because the human being is so clearly a part of nature. No less effort has been put into explaining how this delusion has arisen. It must be obvious to anyone whose character is not [totally devoid of depth/wholly superficial, (superficial is a modern term)  that we are dealing here with one of the most important questions of life, religion, conduct and science.
note: I like the opening sentence meaning but wonder if our goal is to be an "agent". [Also my question, as with ‘free spirit’. Do the terms ‘free agent’ and ‘free thinker’ necessarily imply irresponsibility or carelessness?] See also Tom’s thoughts at
[see note on ‘control’ in 1.6.]

note: could use a chapter glossary at beginning of chapter.
This is a technical reading comprehension point. [Instead of just a glossary, which is a good idea, how about inserting a descriptive overview or abstract on the facing page before each chapter that includes terminology explanations for reading support? Example: In this chapter absolute determinism of human thinking and action is questioned. Determinism means that…] That would be nice though it may be difficult.
1.1 Freedom of Indifferent Choice
A sad indication of the superficiality in contemporary thinking can be found in a book that aims to develop a ‘new faith’ from the results of recent scientific research, and which contains nothing on this question but these words:

“There is no need to go into the question of free will. The supposed freedom of indifferent choice has been recognized as an empty illusion by every reputable philosophy. The determination of moral value in human conduct and character remains untouched by this question.”
(David Friedrich Strauss: Old and New Belief)

I do not quote from this book because I consider it to be particularly significant, but I believe this passage expresses the only view that most contemporary thinkers can reach concerning this question. Everyone who has advanced beyond an elementary science education seems to know that freedom cannot consist of 
willfully/indifferently/impartially choosing one or the other of two possible actions. ...freedom cannot consist of choosing, wholly at will, one or the other of two possible actions. (lindeman) free will is indifferent to reason, nature and willing so the choice is "wholly at will" and even precedes pleasure. We choose to be happy. Science disagrees. -more research below.  There always exists, so we are told, a quite specific reason to explain why we carry out one particular action from among several possibilities.

note: Freedom Of Indifferent Choice? I have added the "?" before but dropped it. The topic is "Freedom of Indifferent Choice" [OK]
[the term for this kind of choosing is important because it almost appears to be the same as ‘what one wants’ in 1.7 but clearly it is different. If you want to use indifferent as the heading then I suggest this is the term that should appear in the text.]
freedom of indifferent choice appears in the Strauss quote.

Some research on "freedom of indifferent choice".
A. Today the Freedom of Indifference has replaced a natural longing for truth, goodness, and happiness.
By Fr. Servais Pinckaers O.P.

Freedom for Excellence has been the classical view of freedom since the advent of Western philosophy. It presupposes that man is naturally moral and so he has the capacity to act with excellence whenever he wishes. This freedom indicates that free will arises from the faculties of reason and will and from a natural longing for truth, goodness, and happiness.

But in the 14th century (William of Ockham), there came a divorce between happiness and the moral life.

He now said that freedom precedes nature. Thus free will precedes reason and will on the level of action and so it is the first faculty of the human person. He defines freedom as the power to choose indifferently between two contraries. Because free will is first, one can choose between being happy and not being happy. There is no natural inclination to happiness, it is a matter of indifferent choice of the free will. Nature is no longer the source of freedom or happiness, it is choice. This is the freedom of indifference.

…..the primacy of the will, together with the denial of nature and the rebellion against authority gave rise to modernism and now post-modernism. The ethics of obligation has been rejected, happiness has been replaced with sensual pleasure, and the only moral absolute is the primacy of choice.

1.2 Freedom of Choice

[2] This seems obvious. Yet the main attacks of today’s opponents of freedom are directed entirely against freedom of choice. Even Herbert Spencer, whose doctrines are gaining ever wider acceptance, says:

“That every one is at liberty to desire or not to desire, which is the real proposition involved in the dogma of free-will, is negatived [refuted] as much by the internal perception of every one as by the contents of the preceding chapters.” (The Principles of Psychology, 1855)

That every one is at liberty to desire or not to desire as they will, which is the real proposition involved in the dogma of free-will, is refuted as much by everyone's own introspective observation as by the contents of the preceding chapters.” (The Principles of Psychology, 1855)

reference: 12-11
[18] What are we to say, from this standpoint, about the distinction mentioned earlier between the two propositions, "To be free means to be able to do what one wants" and, "To be at liberty to desire or not to desire is the real proposition involved in the dogma of freewill"? Hamerling bases his view of free will precisely on this distinction, by declaring the first statement to be correct but the second to be an absurd tautology. He says, "I can do as I want. But to say I can decide/will what I want is an empty tautology." stebbing

That every one is at liberty to desire or not to desire "arbitrarily" (Lipson) "as they please" (Stebbing) as they will (Tom),  which is the real proposition involved in the dogma of free-will, is negatived [refuted] [we certainly can't use negatived] as much by everyone's own introspective observation [important modern phrase to hear] the internal perception of every one  as by the contents of the preceding chapters.” (The Principles of Psychology, 1855)
[I have reinstated the authentic English text by Herbert – it is the original source!] great find--interesting and good to know but not necessarily decisive. We revise Steiner so why not Herbert? Desire or not to desire definitely needs additional words for clarity.
1.3 Free Necessity of One's Own Nature
We are in Realism (external world) so you find words like combat/fighting
Others start from the same standpoint when --combating/ fighting/refuting-- 
the concept of free will. The seeds of all such arguments can be found as early as Spinoza. What he brought forward so clearly and simply against the idea of freedom has since been repeated countless times, usually cloaked in such hairsplitting and theoretical doctrines that it is hard to recognize the only thing that matters, which is his straightforward train of thought. Spinoza writes:

“I call free that which exists and acts out of the pure necessity of its nature; I call compelled that existence and activity determined in an exact and fixed way by something else. For example, God is free, although with necessity, because He exists solely out of the necessity of His own nature. In the same way God knows Himself and everything else freely, because it follows solely out of the necessity of His nature that He knows everything. You see, then, that I locate freedom not in a free decision, but in a free necessity.

[3] “But let us come down to created things, which are all determined by external causes to exist and to act in a fixed and exact way.  To see this more clearly, let us imagine a very simple case. A stone, for example, receives a certain momentum from an external cause that makes contact with it so that afterwards, when the impact of the external cause has ceased, the stone necessarily continues to move. The continued motion of the stone is compelled by the external impact and not by any necessity within the stone’s own nature, because [the continuing motion] has to be defined by the thrust of an external cause. What is true here for the stone is true for everything else, no matter how complex and multifaceted it may be. Everything is determined with necessity by external causes to exist and to act in a fixed and exact way.

[4] “Now please assume that the stone, while in motion, thinks and knows that it is striving to the best of its ability to continue moving along. This stone is conscious only of its own striving, to which it is not at all indifferent, and it will believe that it is absolutely free to continue moving for no other reason than its own will to continue. Yet this is the human freedom that everybody claims to possess, and it consists entirely of the fact that people are conscious only of their desires and ignorant of the causes that determine them. Thus the baby believes it freely desires milk; the angry boy believes he freely demands revenge; and the coward believes he freely chooses to run away. A drunk believes that he says things of his own free will that, when sober again, he will wish he hadn’t said; and since this bias is inborn in everybody, it is difficult to free oneself from it. Even though experience teaches us often enough that people can moderate their desires least of all, and that when moved by two opposing passions they see the better and pursue the worse; yet they still consider themselves free because they desire some things less intensely, and there are some desires that can be easily inhibited by preoccupying oneself/becoming preoccupied with memories of something else.” (Letter of October or November, 1674)

[5] Because this view is so clearly and emphatically?? precisely expressed it is easy to uncover its fundamental error.

I don't see that Spinoza's "certainty" has anything to do with uncovering the error, but his preciseness w   ould.

bestimmt: definitely, certain, precise
emphatically: without question and beyond doubt
everybody uses definitely: without doubt
precise: clearly expressed or delineated

Human beings are supposedly compelled to carry out an action when driven to it by any cause with the same necessity as a stone that carries out a specific movement after an impact. It is only because human beings are conscious of their action that they regard themselves as the free originator(s)/instigator [originator has more significance in the free will debate] [the plural "originators" sounds bad and doesn't work well, can the "s" just be dropped?] of it. But in so doing they overlook the causes driving them, which they must obey unconditionally. The error in this train of thought is soon discovered. Spinoza and all who think like him are overlooking the fact that human beings can be conscious, not only of their actions, but also of the causes that guide them. Anyone can see that a baby is not free when it desires milk and that the drunk is not free who says things he later regrets. Neither knows anything of the causes working deep within their organism that exercise an irresistible control over them. But is it right to lump such actions together with those of human beings who are conscious, not only of their actions, but also of the causes of their actions? Are the actions of human beings really all of one kind? Should the actions of a warrior on the battlefield, a research scientist in the laboratory or a diplomat involved in complex negotiations be placed in the same scientific category as those of a baby who desires milk? It is no doubt best to seek the solution of a problem where the conditions are simplest. But the inability to see distinctions has often caused endless confusion. There is certainly a profound difference between knowing and not knowing why I act. At first sight this seems to be an entirely obvious truth. Yet the opponents of freedom never ask themselves whether a motive of action that I recognize and understand is to be designated as a compulsion for me in the same sense as the organic process which causes the baby infant to cry for milk.

first break>>>>

1.4 Free from External Influences
[6] Eduard von Hartman asserts in his Phenomenology of Moral Consciousness that the human will depends on two main factors: motives and character. If we see people as all alike, or at least having negligible differences, then their will appears to be determined from outside by the circumstances that come to meet them.
But if we keep in mind that different people make an idea or mental picture into a motive of action.... But if we keep in mind that different people allow (to passive) an idea become a motive of action only if their character is such that a particular idea arouses a desire in them, then the human being appears to be determined from inside within  and not from outside. But because an idea given to us from outside must first be adopted as a motive according to our character, we believe that we are free and independent of external influences. However, according to Eduard von Hartmann the truth is that,

3 choices
inside and outside
within and without
within and outside

determined from within and determined from outside sound the best as stand alone sentences.
So Stebbing uses both. The others select one pair or the other so the terms are compatible at the expense of clarity. I like clarity over poetry since I like clear descriptions that are used to locate experience while poetry merely evokes feelings. Though this particular case is not that critical.

“Even though we must first adopt an idea as a motive ourselves, we do not do this arbitrarily, but rather according to the necessity of [our characterological disposition / the disposition of our character]; which means that we are anything but free.”

characterological disposition seems to be a real term in psychology today so I think it is worth keeping.

Here again, the difference is completely ignored between those motives that I allow to influence me only after I have consciously made them my own, and those that I follow without having any clear knowledge of them.
note: I wonder if we can get away with using the word idea rather than "mental picture" in section 1.5. The same Vorstellung will need to be mental picture later. [Let’s try. Personally I find it blurs the connection from this quote to the later text in 1.10. We don't want to blur anything. I will have to come back to this when I get to 1.10.  In any case mental image will be used instead of mental picture in 1.10 and 1.11.]
1.5 Action [Result of / Resulting from] Conscious Motive I'm trying to keep these short unless we have confusion in this case in regard to meaning.

[7] This leads straight to the standpoint from which the subject will be considered here. Can the question of free will be posed narrowly by itself?
Can the question of free will be posed narrowly by itself without being one-sided? And if not, what other question needs to be connected to it?

[Frage nach der Freiheit unseres Willens überhaupt einseitig für sich gestellt werden?
Can the question of free will be posed on its own without being merely one-sided? /
Can the question of freedom be directed exclusively to the will? /
Is the question of freedom exclusively a question of the will?
And if not, what other question needs to be [connected/coupled] to it?

[The first question here is a critical turning point so deserves very careful wording. I favour the last option listed so far.]

H,W- Have we any right to consider the question of the freedom of the will by itself at all? And if not, with what other question must it necessarily be connected?
S63- Is it at all permissible to consider by itself the question of the freedom of our will? And if not: With what other question must it necessarily be connected?
S92- Can the question regarding freedom of the will be discussed by itself in isolation? And if not, with what other question must it necessarily be connected?
Lin-May the question of the freedom of our will be asked at all by itself, in a one-sided way? And if not: with what other question must it necessarily be linked? 
Lip- Can the question
of the freedom of our will be posed narrowly by itself? And, if not, with what other questions must it necessarily be linked? 

[8] If there is a difference between a conscious and an unconscious motive of action, then the conscious motive will result in an action that must be judged differently from one [done out of/a little crude but very clear /that follows] blind impulse. Our first question will consider this difference. The results of this inquiry will then determine the approach we need to take toward the question of freedom itself.

[9] What does it mean to have knowledge of the motives of one's actions? Too little attention has been given to this question because unfortunately the indivisible whole that is the human being has always been torn in two. The doer has been separated from the knower, while the one who matters the most has been overlooked: the knowing doer who acts out of knowledge. this is so important to remember I wonder if we can state both versions
note: "knowing doer" sticks with you. [OK]
1.6 Free When Controlled by Reason
[10] It is said that human beings are free when they are controlled only by their reason and not by animal passions. In other words, freedom means being able to determine one’s life and actions according to purposeful aims and deliberate decisions.

[11] Nothing is gained by such assertions. For the question is whether reason, purpose and decisions exercise just the same kind of [compulsion/control] very good- over a person as animal passions. If, without any effort on my part, a rational decision emerges in me with the same urgent need as the onset of hunger and thirst, then I must obey it and my freedom is an illusion.
note: I read that being in "control" is very important to people. [‘Control’ could be applied in other instances of ‘compulsion’. See my suggestion for the chapter’s opening sentence that takes this into account. Very awakening for the reader!]
1.7 Free to Do as One Wants
[12] Another claim is made that freedom does not mean being able to determine what one wants, but being able to do what one wants. This thought has been very clearly expressed by poet and philosopher Robert Hamerling in his Atomistics of the Will:

“The human being can certainly do what he wants, but he cannot determine what he wants, because his will is determined by motives! [He cannot determine what he wants? / Can he not determine what he wants?] Let us look at these words more closely. Do they make any sense? Is free will then being able to want something without having grounds, without a motive? But what does wanting mean other than having grounds for doing or trying to do this rather than that? To want something without grounds, without a motive, would be to want something without wanting it. The concept of wanting is inseparable from the concept of motive. Without a determining motive the will is an empty faculty; only through the motive does it become active and real. Therefore, it is entirely correct that the human will is not ‘free’ to the extent that its direction is always determined by the strongest motive. But, in contrast to this ‘unfreedom’, it is absurd to speak of a possible ‘freedom’ of the will that amounts to having the ability to want what one does not want.”
note: do we really need page numbers to these old books? [no, because we cannot be consistent where we have no access to the original texts]
[The use of ‘determine’ at the top of the quote certainly makes sense, but we lose the play on words. Never mind.]
[13] Here too, only motives in general are discussed without considering the difference between unconscious and conscious motives. If a motive affects me and I am compelled to act on it because it proves to be the ‘strongest’ of its kind, then the idea of freedom ceases to have any meaning. Why should it matter to me whether I can do something or not if I am forced by the motive to do it? The primary question is not whether I can or cannot do something after a motive has influenced me, but whether any motives exist other than those that [compel/control] me with absolute necessity. If I must want something, then I may be completely indifferent as to whether I can also do it. If a motive that I think is unreasonable is forced upon me because of my character, or the circumstances prevailing in my environment, then I would have to be glad if I could not do what I wanted. do what I want- "do what I want" fits the phrasing better in this section (do what one wants, to want, I must want etc. --am I having a poetic moment?

[14] The question is not whether I am able to carry out a decision once it is [made/formed
[psychism is how things relate to me, "I made" seems more personal and contemporary] /established – echoes in 1.10 [this is difficult because Steiner changes word selection according to the particular view and chapter mood, see note below], but how the decision [comes about/emerges] within me. Do we experience a decision as arising, as emerging, or as coming about? For me I would say it 'comes about". Feelings arise for me but not decisions. I can track back and see how the decision "came about".

note: If he handles each view and each chapter mood differently how can a consistent style be developed. See 1-5 mathematism in this chapter to see the switch to a mathemtism style.-if,..then..

In H&CT he talks of 12 views, 7 moods, 3 tones, and 1 anthropomorphism (p54). The 1 would be how everything could be of a consistant style. "Anthropomorphism is when a person takes all the world-pictures to some extent, restricts himself only to what he can experience on or around or in himself." Actually, you are already doing this according to your process so I quess you are on the right track.

note: for some translators everything is arising. [noted – is the concept of ‘arising’ significant enough to warrant using one term consistently? I haven't noticed that significance, I think it is minor. Emergence is a very new scientific study.] 
I did a study of the use of (cause, reason, motive, grounds) for action, and decided that Hoernle maintains these distinctions in the best way. [OK – ‘grounds’ relates to the title of Chapter 2: Compelling Grounds for (Acquiring) Scientific Knowledge]
1.8 Unconditioned Will
[15] Rational thinking fundamentally distinguishes human beings from all other living beings. Activity we have in common with other organisms. Nothing is gained by seeking analogies in the animal kingdom to clarify a concept of freedom that applies to the actions of human beings. Modern natural science loves such analogies. When scientists have successfully identified something similar/a similarity to human behaviour among animals, they believe they have touched on the most significant question of the science of humanity. There is an example of the misunderstandings resulting from this view in Paul Rée’s book The Illusion of Free Will, which says the following about freedom:

“It is easy to explain why the movement of a stone appears to come about by necessity, while the will of a donkey does not. The causes that set the stone in motion are external and visible, while the causes that determine the donkey's will are internal and invisible. Between us and the place of their activity is the skull of the donkey.….. The conditional causality is not seen, so it is thought to be nonexistent. An explanation is then given that the will, which is the cause of the donkey’s turning around, is itself unconditioned; it is an absolute beginning (a first cause and not a link in a chain of events). But a presumption of this kind is contradicted by experience and the universal validity of the law of causality.”  this part in bourgundy was added and is essential
and should be in the text [*]
[* Rée continues: “… Let us now leave the animal kingdom and proceed to consider the human being. Everything is the same here.”] *this part in purple is not essential and merely repeats what is said above so it could be dropped.
note: I looked up this quote and added more of Rée's sentences because the freedom involved was unclear. [Very good addition. The added text should be marked in some way. Should it be relegated to a footnote, as above? ]

Here too human actions in which there is consciousness of their motives are simply ignored, for Rée declares that “Between us and the place of their activity is the skull of the donkey.” These words show that Rée has no clue that there are actions -- not a donkey's actions, to be sure, but human actions -- where a motive that has become conscious lies between us and the action. Rée demonstrates his blindness again, a few pages later, with these words:   

“We do not perceive the causes that determine our will, and so we believe it is not causally determined at all.”

[16] Surely these examples are enough to prove that many argue against freedom without knowing what freedom really is.

But enough of examples proving that many argue against freedom without knowing at all/in the least what freedom is. All the other translators have a similar version like this which I think captures Steiner's spirited "attitude". We don't want to tame the rebel do we?

1.9 [Knowledge/Consciousness] of The Motive consciousness of the motive is achieved in 1.5
[17] It is obvious that an action cannot be free if the doer carries it out without knowing why. But what about the freedom of an action when its motives are known? This leads us to the question of the origin and significance of thinking.

For without knowledge of the thinking activity of the mind, it is impossible to form a concept of what it means to know [something/anything], including what it means to have knowledge of an action.

When we fully understand what thinking in general means it will be easy to see clearly the role thinking plays in human action.

A study of chapter 3 should be enough to understand what thinking "in general" means without "fully" understanding.

Hegel is right when he says that “it is only thinking that turns the soul, which animals also possess, into spirit.” It will also be thinking that gives human action its distinguishing features.

second break>>>>>>>>>>>..

1.10  Action Springs from the Heart   / Heart-Impelled Action
[This certainly does not mean / I certainly do not intend to imply] that all our actions flow only from the sober deliberations of our reason. Actions that follow from abstract judgment alone are far from being the only actions that [can be called / I would call] human in its highest sense. But the moment our conduct lifts itself above the satisfaction of purely animal desires, our motives are always shaped by thoughts. Love, compassion, and patriotism are driving forces for actions that cannot be reduced to cold concepts of the understanding. It can be said [This needs to be "it is said" to be consistent so that it is clear that a view is being expressed as these tend to mark a view-point ] that this is the place where heart-felt sensibility comes into its own. Of this there can be no doubt. But the heart and its sensibility do not create the motives of action.
The motives are already established before being taken up into the heart's realm.
The motives are already [made/established/formed "established" seems more impersonal as this motive is separate from the heart– this word echoes from 1.7] before being received into the heart’s domain. whether to use "heart's domain" or "heart" is an accurate meaning issue. "heart's realm".

note: earlier in this section we "lift" ourselves above animal desires, now we "take up" (not passive like received?) into heart's realm.

Sie setzen dieselben voraus und nehmen(to take) sie in ihren (their) Bereich (domain) auf (up).
nehmen: to take, to pick
auf: up
Bereich: range, realm, area, scope, domain

other translators: take into domain (Lin), receive into their own realm (Lip), other translators drop it and say heart lets motive enter.

Compassion enters my heart only after the mental image of a person arousing compassion appears in my consciousness. The way to the heart is through the head.

I like Lipson's use of Vorstellung using idea, mental image and picture in chapter 1 and have revised 1.4, 1.11, 1.12. We will need to use mental picture regularly later. Lipson gives a good transition to it in chapter 1 from idea to image to picture.

1.11 Love of Another / Love as Motive can love really be a motive?
Love is no exception to this. If it is not merely the expression of the sexual drive, then it depends on the mental images pictures (image "appears" 1.10, mental picture "formed" 1.11) we form of the loved one. The more idealistic are these mental pictures, the more blissful is our love. Even here, thought is the father of feeling.

1.12 Seeing Good Qualities
It is said that love makes us blind to the flaws of the loved one. But we can turn this around and say that love opens our eyes to the good qualities of the loved one. Many pass by without noticing these good qualities. One person sees them and, just because of this, love awakens within. What has this person done other than make a mental image picture of something that hundreds of others have failed to see? Others do not love because they lack the mental image picture.

From whatever point we want to "wanting" doesn't seem right here, most translations dropped it or used "however we like"(Lip) consider the subject, it becomes ever clearer that an investigation into the origin of thought is required before questioning the nature of human action. Therefore I will now turn to this question.

note: "Seeing Good Qualities"  seeing, eyes,  relates to sensationalism. I don't mean to imply limitation of sensationalism. [Are you sure, Tom? This appellation implies that the set of good qualities here only includes the sensory perceptions of shapely legs, bronze pecs, blonde hair, etc. which hundreds of passersby would also surely notice. I suspect that Steiner did not intend this limitation, but also had in mind persuasive character and personality traits such as: rich family, good cook, knows his own mind, supports Obama, can hold her liquor, good with children, etc. Are these also sensational phenomena of the seeing mind?]
[All occurrences of mental picture changed to mental image. German: Vorstellung image is a more vague term]
======== end of Chapter 1 =========
The next version will be the Final Draft and the last chance to comment.